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Abstract
If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, every-
thing supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if
there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the
physical facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what
logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be ac-
commodated in a purely physical world.
1 Introduction
If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything super-
venes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. In a coherent physicalist ontology
there is no room for abstract and mental entities with which logic and mathe-
matics are routinely associated. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical
facts, they must be understood in terms of the physical reality; they must be
necessitated by the physical facts of the world. So, in a physicalist ontology, the
following two questions must be answered: 1) What does a logical/mathematical
fact consist in? In other words: What is it that must be necessitated by the
physical facts of the world? 2) How does this necessitation come about? The
aim of a physicalist philosophy of mathematics (first outlined in [1]) is to clarify
these questions and to explain how logic and mathematics can be accommo-
dated in a purely physical ontology. In this paper, I shall articulate the basic
ideas, and provide a few more arguments for the physicalist interpretation of
formal systems.
To avoid any misunderstanding, it is worthwhile to make a distinction: what
I call physicalist philosophy of mathematics has nothing to do with imma-
nent/physical realism or naturalism (as in [2, 3, 4, 5]). According to the latter
the mathematical concepts and propositions reflect some fundamental features
of the physical world. In contrast, the proposed physicalist interpretation of
formal logic and mathematics will be based on the strongest formalist approach
1
to mathematics; according to which mathematical objects carry no meanings
whatsoever. “The formulas are not about anything; they are just strings of
symbols” ([6], p. 319); or, as Hilbert allegedly expressed this idea in a famous
aphorism about Euclidean geometry: “One must be able to say at all times—
instead of points, straight lines, and planes—tables, chairs, and beer mugs” ([7],
p. 81).
2 Truth in a physical theory
To avoid any misunderstanding later in the paper, let us first clarify the essen-
tial difference between mathematical “truth” and a semantic truth in a physical
theory describing something in the world. A physical theory (L, S) is a formal
system L with a partial semantics S, where S is pointing to the (empirical)
world. In general, L is a (first-order) formal language with some logical ax-
ioms and the derivation rules (usually the first-order predicate calculus with
identity), the axioms of certain mathematical theories, and, of course, some
physical axioms.
Consider a sentence A in physical theory (L, S). One has to distinguish the
following two cases:
To be a theorem: L ` A (a fact of the formal system L).
To be true: According to the semantics S, A refers to a state of affairs
in the physical world, which is in fact the case (a fact of the
physical system described by the theory).
For example, ‘The electric field strength of a point charge is kQr2 ’ is a theorem of
Maxwell’s electrodynamics—one can derive the corresponding formal expression
from the Maxwell equations. (This is a fact of the formal system L.) On the
other hand, according to the semantics relating the symbols of the Maxwell
theory to the empirical terms, this sentence corresponds to an empirical fact
(about the point charges).
From an epistemological point of view, to be a theorem and to be true are
different and independent concepts, in the sense that one does not automatically
imply the other. Of course, one of the aims of a physical theory is to keep the two
things in synchrony throughout the region of validity of the theory in question.
However, assume that Γ is a set of true sentences in L, i.e., each sentence in
Γ refers to an empirical fact, and also assume that Γ ` A in L. It does not
automatically follow that A is true. Whether A is true is again an empirical
question. If so, then it is a new empirically obtained information about the
world, confirming the validity of the whole physical theory (L, S).
But if it turns out that A is not true, then this information falsifies the
physical theory, as a whole. That is to say, one has to think about revising
one of the constituents of (L, S), the physical axioms, the semantics S, the
mathematical axioms, or the axioms of logic or the derivation rules of L—
probably in this order.
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3 What are logical/mathematical facts?
Having clarified the difference between being true and being derived, it is worth-
while briefly reviewing the main argument for the formalist thesis that mathe-
matical propositions have no meanings—even if, as platonists and intuitionists
assume, these meanings would refer not to the physical but to the platonic or
to the mental realms. The argument is, in some weak sense, based on the truth-
condition theory of meaning. If we accept that “a meaning for a sentence is
something that determines the conditions under which the sentence is true or
false” ([8], p. 173), and the physical realist/platonist/intuitionist understanding
of mathematics is correct, then the truth-condition of a mathematical proposi-
tion must be found in the physical/platonic/mental world. In that case, in the
verification of a mathematical statement, there must occur some reference both
to the state of affairs in the physical/platonic/mental world and to the means
by which we have epistemic access to these worlds. But there is no trace of this
in the practice of mathematics.
For example, consider a very simple mathematical theory: the theory of
groups (Fig. 1). What will the mathematician answer to the following questions:
“Why is p(e, p(e, e)) = e true?”; “How do we know that p(e, p(e, e)) = e is
true?”; “How can we verify that p(e, p(e, e)) = e is true?”? In answering these
question, the mathematician never even mentions how the things are in the
physical/platonic/mental world and never even mentions the epistemic means
by which we have access to these realms. For the mathematician’s final argument
is that formula p(e, p(e, e)) = e has a proof in group theory; and (s)he will show
us an evidence like in Fig. 2. In Dummett’s words:
Like the empiricist view, the platonist one fails to do justice to the
role of proof in mathematics. For, presumably, the supra-sensible
realm is as much God’s creature as is the sensible one; if so, condi-
tions in it must be as contingent as in the latter. [...] [W]e do not
seek, in order to refute or confirm a [mathematical] hypothesis, a
means of refining our intuitive faculties, as astronomers seek to im-
prove their instruments. Rather, if we suppose the hypothesis true,
we seek for a proof of it, and it remains a mere hypothesis, whose
assertion would therefore be unwarranted, until we find one. ([9], p.
13)
Therefore, a mathematical proposition (like “p(e, p(e, e)) = e”) does not have
meaning; it does not refer to anything and cannot be true or false in the ordinary
semantical sense (like a sentence of a physical theory). It is actually not a
linguistic object, it is just a “brick” in a formal system—consequently, it does
not express a fact whatsoever.
It is important to note that one must not confuse such a mathematical
“brick” with the meta-mathematical sentence stating the provability of this
“brick”; for example, “p(e, p(e, e)) = e” with “{Group} ` p(e, p(e, e)) = e”. The
latter is a meaningful meta-mathematical sentence, asserting a property of the
formal system called group theory, namely that there is a proof of p(e, p(e, e)) =
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Alphabet
variables x, y, z, . . .
individual constants e (identity)
function symbols i, p (inverse, product)
predicate symbol =
others (, ), ,
logical symbols ∀,¬ →
Derivation rules
(MP) φ, (φ→ ψ) ⇒ ψ (modus ponens)
(G) φ ⇒ ∀xφ (generalization)
Axioms I. (logical)
(PC1) (φ→ (ψ → φ))
(PC2) ((φ→ (ψ → χ))→ (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ))
(PC3) ((¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → φ))
(PC4) (∀x (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ∀xψ)) (given that x is not free in φ)
(PC5) (∀xφ→ φ) (given that x is not free in φ)
(PC6) (∀xφ(x)→ φ(y)) (given that whenever a free occurrence of x
is replaced by y, y is free in φ(y))
(E1) x = x
(E2) t = s→ fn (u1, u2, . . . , t, . . . un) = fn (u1, u2, . . . , s, . . . un)
(E3) t = s→ (φ (u1, u2, . . . , t, . . . un)→ φ (u1, u2, . . . , s, . . . un))
Axioms II. (of group theory)
(G1) p(p(x, y), z) = p(x, p(y, z)) (associative law)
(G2) p(e, x) = x (left identity)
(G3) p(i(x), x) = e (left inverse)
Figure 1: Group theory
(1) p(e, x) = x (G2)
(2) (∀x)(p(e, x) = x) (G)
(3) (∀x)(p(e, x) = x)→ p(e, e) = e (PC6)
(4) p(e, e) = e (2), (3), (MP)
(5) (∀x)(p(e, x) = x)→ p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e) (PC6)
(6) p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e) (2), (5), (MP)
(7) p(e, e) = e→ p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e)→ p(e, p(e, e)) = e (E3)
(8) p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e)→ p(e, p(e, e)) = e (4), (7), (MP)
(9) p(e, p(e, e)) = e (6), (8), (MP)
Figure 2: The proof of p(e, p(e, e)) = e
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Notebook
Figure 3: A formal system represented in a notebook with a CD. The CD con-
tains a program making the computer to list the theorems of the formal system
e in the system. The validity of this statement can be verified by the close
observation of Figure 2. This is what can be considered as a mathematical fact.
4 Ontology of formal systems
Now we arrive at the point where the physicalist approach I propose becomes
different from the standard formalist philosophy of mathematics. The question
we are asking now is: Where are the states of affairs located in the ontolog-
ical picture of the world that make the meta-mathematical propositions like
“{Group} ` p(e, p(e, e)) = e” true or false? My main thesis is that a formal
system must be regarded as a physical system which consists of signs and deriva-
tional mechanisms embodied in concrete physical objects and concrete physical
processes. Therefore, a Σ ` φ-type meta-mathematical proposition expresses an
objective fact of the physical world, namely, a fact of the formal system itself
as a particular portion of the physical world.
I will argue for this physicalist account of formal systems in three steps. I
shall show that
(I) A formal systems can be represented in a physical system.
(II) We have access to a formal system only in some concrete physical repre-
sentation.
(III) Actually, there is nothing to be “represented”; there is nothing beyond
the flesh and blood physical “representations”.
(I) Let me start with a commonly accepted view. Imagine a notebook with
an inserted CD (Fig. 3). The CD contains a program completely determining
the notebook’s behavior: in some order, the computer lists the theorems and
the proofs of a formal system. I think, it is commonly accepted to say that
in the “computer + CD” system we have “a physical representation of the
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formal system” in question. In this representation, it is obviously true that the
fact of whether or not a given formula φ is a theorem, that is, whether or not
the computer will print out formula φ to the screen, is a fact of the physical
world; namely, it is entirely determined by the physical process going on within
the region symbolized by the dotted line (Fig. 3); it is predetermined by the
physical laws and the initial state of the computer and the CD—note that a
“program” is nothing but a certain physical state of the surface of the CD.
Thus, in this physical representation, the statement that Σ ` φ is an ordinary
scientific statement:
(1) it expresses an objective fact of the physical world;
(2) it can be true before anybody discovers it;
(3) it is a posteriori, and accordingly, not necessary and not certain.
Points (1) and (2) are quite obvious; they are straightforward consequences of
the fact that Σ ` φ asserts the existence of a physical process inside of the
dotted line, irrespectively of whether anybody observes this process or not, and
irrespectively of the fact that a computer is an artifact—a constellation in the
physical world caused by mankind. Point (2) holds even in a stronger sense.
Σ ` φ actually asserts the existence of a physical process, given certain initial
conditions within the dotted line—to be a ‘notebook + CD’ in the initial state.
The laws of nature probably predetermine whether this process is possible or
not, even if nobody has initiated such a process yet. This simply refers to the
normal situation in sciences. For example, it was true that the laws of nature
admitted a chemical process ending with a plastic, say PVC (polyvinyl chloride),
molecule, even before the chemist Eugen Baumann discovered the existence of
this process in 1872. And this is true, even if there had been no PVC molecule
in the universe before Baumann.
Point (3) sounds baﬄing, especially in the light of the age-long dispute be-
tween rationalism and empiricism. We will return to this issue in the last section.
At this stage, however, we are only concerned with the “physical representation
of the formal system”; and, in this physical representation, Σ ` φ is no doubt
a contingent fact of the physical world inside of the dotted line, the knowledge
of which cannot be necessary, certain, or a priori. It can be known only by a
posteriori means, just like a chemical reaction.
(II) What causes us to believe that, although it cannot be known a priori
whether the computer will print out formula φ to the screen, still Σ ` φ “in the
mathematical sense” is a necessary/a priori knowable truth? This belief comes
from the following intuition: “The programmed computer is merely a physical
representation of an abstract mathematical formal system in which Σ ` φ is
true. If this physical representation is faithful then the computer necessarily
prints out formula φ to the screen. If the computer happens not to print out
φ to the screen, it only means that the physical representation is not faithful.”
But how can anybody know that Σ ` φ is true in the formal system “in the
6
mathematical sense”? The usual idea is that it can be known to anyone who
executes the formal derivation of φ from Σ in the head. So what we actually
do is represent the formal system in a brain and observe the behavior of the
brain. Human brain is however not entirely reliable, so we prefer to execute the
derivation in a brain+hand+pen+paper system. Anyway, from a physicalist
point of view, it does not matter whether the formal system in question is
represented in a human brain or a brain+hand+pen+paper system or any other
physical system. As a matter of fact, we can represent the formal system in the
mathematical sense in another computer; and if this second computer prints out
φ, we say that Σ ` φ is a priori true; and, accordingly, if the first computer also
prints out φ to the screen, we say that it works properly; and the representation
of the abstract/mathematical formal system in the first computer is faithful.
But what would be the reason to put the second computer in such a privileged
position? Upon what grounds can one physical representation be singled out as
“the right one”? It is nonsense.
We have to recognize that the only sources of our mathematical knowledge
are the formal systems embodied in concrete physical forms; and this knowledge
can be obtained only by a posteriori means. From this point of view we must
agree with the quantum computer theorists David Deutsch, Artur Ekert, and
Rossella Lupacchini:
Numbers, sets, groups and algebras have an autonomous reality
quite independent of what the laws of physics decree, and the prop-
erties of these mathematical structures can be just as objective as
Plato believed they were (and as Roger Penrose now advocates).
But they are revealed to us only through the physical world. It is
only physical objects, such as computers or human brains, that ever
give us glimpses of the abstract world of mathematics.
...
It seems that we have no choice but to recognize the dependence of
our mathematical knowledge (though not, we stress, of mathematical
truth itself) on physics, and that being so, it is time to abandon the
classical view of computation as a purely logical notion independent
of that of computation as a physical process. ([10], pp. 265–283)
(III) In contrast to the first part of the above quoted passage, in my view,
the ontological outcome of these epistemological considerations is the following:
if there are no knowable truths other than the ones knowable from the physical
world, there is no reason to be ontologically committed to the abstract/platonic
things that these other truths would be about. But before drawing such a
conclusion, let us consider a possible objection.
Many philosophers of mathematics, while admitting that a formal system
is always represented in physical form, still assume that there is an “abstract
structure” behind this physical representation, something that is represented.
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Sometimes we find the same ambivalent views in the formalist school. Curry
writes:
[A]lthough a formal system may be represented in various ways, yet
the theorems derived according to the specifications of the primi-
tive frame remain true without regard to changes in representation.
There is, therefore, a sense in which the primitive frame defines a
formal system as a unique object of thought. This does not mean
that there is a hypostatized entity called a formal system which ex-
ists independently of any representation. On the contrary, in order
to think of a formal system at all we must think of it as represented
somehow. But when we think of it as formal system we abstract
from all properties peculiar to the representation. ([11], p. 30)
But, what does such an “abstraction” actually mean? What do we obtain if we
abstract from some unimportant, peculiar properties of a physical system L con-
stituting a “physical representation of a formal system”? In order to think of this
abstraction at all, in order to differentiate the important and unimportant fea-
tures of physical system L, and to change from a more detailed representation of
the system to a less detailed one, we must have a physical theory (M,S) describ-
ing the physical system L in question. That is to say, the whole abstraction—the
result of the abstraction included—is described in (M,S). However, the formal
system M also is “represented somehow”, in Curry’s terminology; it is another
flesh and blood formal system. So, instead of obtaining a non-physical “abstract
formal system” we remain to have flesh and blood formal systems.
Similarly, one cannot obtain an abstract formal system as an “equivalence
class of isomorphic” flesh and blood formal systems L1, L2, . . . Ln. To compare
physical systems L1, L2, . . . Ln we have to use a physical theory (M,S) which is
capable of describing all L1, L2, . . . Ln together (Fig. 4). Only in a suitable M
it is meaningful to say that the theoretical representations of L1, L2, . . . Ln are
isomorphic and constitute an equivalence class. Only in M we can define the
prototype of these structures, which can be regarded as an “abstract mathemat-
ical structure”. But, all these objects live in the formal system M which also
is “represented somehow”, that is, in a formal system existing in the physical
world.
Thus, formal systems are always flesh and blood physical systems. These
concrete physical systems should not be regarded as physical “representations”
of some “abstract formal systems”. Abstraction does not produce such abstract
things over and above the physically existing formal systems—abstraction is a
move from the concrete to the concrete.
Note that this claim does not deny the commitment to universals in the sense
of scientific realism. When a satisfactorily confirmed physical theory (L, S)
claims that a physical object has a certain property adequately represented by
means of a formal system L, then this reflects an objective feature of physical
reality. When many different physical objects display a similar property that
is describable by means of the same element of a formal system, then we may
claim that these physical objects all possess the feature in question. This will
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Ln
Figure 4: It is a categorical mistake to talk about “isomorphism” between phys-
ical systems. “Isomorphism” is a concept which is meaningful only in a formal
system containing set theory. In order to say that “physical representations of
formal systems” are “isomorphic” we need a physical theory (M,S) in which
the object systems are simultaneously represented
be a true common feature of the group of objects in question—described by
means of the elements of a formal system as a real physical system. This is also
true for the description of some general features of a group of formal systems (as
physical objects). But, this realist commitment does not entitle us to claim that
“abstract structures” exist over and above the real formal systems of physical
existence. Again, the reason is that if we tried to consider such an “abstract
structure” as a feature of the formal system itself, or as a general feature of many
similar formal systems, then we would only obtain some elements of another
formal system of physical existence.
Finally, in view of what has been said, two consequences must be quite clear.
First, the formal system L used in a physical theory (L, S) is itself a physical
system.1 Second, a meta-mathematical theory describing a formal system L1 is
nothing but a physical theory (L2, S), where L2 is a formal system (of physical
existence) and the semantics S points to the object formal system L1 (as the
physical system to be described).
To sum up, a formal system is a part of the physical world; the marks of
the formal system are physical objects or physical phenomena related to the
1Without entering into the details, a semantics S also can be accounted for in physical
terms.
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system and the derivation rules are embodied in those regularities that govern
the system’s behavior. The existence of a mathematical derivation, making a
proposition of type Σ ` φ true, is a physical fact of the formal system as a
part of the physical world. To prove a theorem is nothing but to observe this
fact—for example, to observe a derivation process in a computer—that is, to
observe a physical fact about a physical system. That is all.
Thus, physicalist account of mathematics completes the formalist foundation
of mathematics, and removes the last residues of platonism, mentalism and
immanent realism.2 The physicalist ontology of mathematical facts makes it
completely pointless in mathematics to introduce a concept of “truth” different
from that of being proved. A mathematical proposition, a theorem, as a formula
in a formal system, does not carry meaning and semantic truth. At the same
time, however, the fact that it is a theorem is a physical fact—a fact of the flesh
and blood formal system itself. In this way, indeed, “mathematical truth is a
part of objective reality” (Cf. [12]).
This is the way I propose to naturalize mathematics. In this way, mathemat-
ical knowledge is not conventional—there is nothing conventional in the state-
ment Σ ` X. It is not trivial—sometimes it is highly non-trivial whether Σ ` X.
It is not perfect, not a priori, and not certain. Just like non-mathematical sci-
ences, mathematics delivers to us knowledge of contingent facts about a partic-
ular part of the physical world. Formal systems constitute this particular part
of the physical world. This is what we can call “mathematical reality”, and
mathematicians rightly think themselves as scientists, exploring the intricacies
of mathematical reality.
5 Induction versus deduction
We have arrived at the conclusion that the knowledge we obtain through a
deductive inference is nothing but an empirical knowledge we obtain through
the observation of the formal system in question; through the observation of a
physical fact of a physical system. Consequently, the certainty of mathematics,
that is the degree of certainty with which one can know the result of a deductive
inference, is the same as the degree of certainty of our knowledge about any
other physical facts.
In order to explain the universal conviction that mathematical truths are
necessary and certain, notice that there are many elements of our everyday
2In order to make clear the distinction between my physicalist interpretation of mathemat-
ics and immanent realism, let me give one more example. ’a2 + b2 = c2’ is a theorem of Eu-
clidean geometry, {Euclidean} ` a2 + b2 = c2. According to immanent realism, ’a2 + b2 = c2’
reflects some general truth about the real triangles in the physical world. Or at least, in the
sense of the structuralist version of realism, the axiomatic theory “Euclidean geometry”, as a
whole, expresses some true structural property of the physical world; something about the con-
gruence of rigid bodies, or the likes. Physicalism also claims that {Euclidean} ` a2 + b2 = c2
expresses something in the physical world. But this something has nothing to do with the
physical triangles and rigid bodies. {Euclidean} ` a2 + b2 = c2 expresses a property of the
formal system “Euclidean geometry”, a property of the physical system consisting of the signs
and the derivation mechanisms.
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knowledge which seem to be necessary and certain, but are actually obtained
from inductive generalization. Break a long stick. We are “sure” about the
outcome: the result is a shorter stick. This regularity of the physical world is
known to us from experiences. The certainty of this knowledge is, however, no
less than the certainty of the inference, say, from the Euclidean axioms to the
height theorem.
Thus, mathematical and logical truths express objective facts of a particular
part of the physical world, namely, the facts of the formal systems themselves.
They are synthetic, a posteriori, not necessary, and not certain; they are fallible,
but have contingent factual content, as any similar scientific assertion. On the
other hand, the fact that the formal systems usually are simple physical systems
of stable behavior and that the knowledge of mathematical and logical truths
does not require observations of the world external to the formal systems ex-
plains, psychologically, why mathematical and logical truths appear to everyone
to be necessary, certain and a priori.
The age-long rationalist–empiricist debate is based on the delusion that rea-
soning can deliver us truth of higher degree of certainty than inductive general-
ization. As we have seen, mathematical and logical truth is nothing but knowl-
edge obtained through inductive generalization from experiences with respect to
a particular physical system, the formal system itself. Since mathematical and
logical derivation is reasoning par excellence, one must conclude that there is
no higher degree of certainty than the one available in inductive generalization.
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